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TWO MODELS FOR AMENDING THE ‘FLEEING FELON’ RULE 
Cynthia V. Ward* 
The so-called “fleeing felon” rule instructs courts and law-
enforcement personnel about whether, and when, police may use deadly 
force to stop a suspect who is attempting to escape arrest.1 At common 
law, police were allowed to use deadly force when necessary to prevent 
the escape of a fleeing felon, even if the escapee did not present an 
imminent threat of violence to the officers or others.2 By contrast, the 
right of private citizens to use deadly force against another person is 
generally restricted to situations involving self-defense—where an 
innocent person reasonably believes she is facing an imminent threat of 
death or serious bodily injury and using deadly force is necessary to 
prevent those outcomes.3  
In several cases since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has laid down a 
constitutional standard which significantly departs from the common-law 
fleeing felon rule and instead applies the Fourth Amendment’s “objective 
reasonableness” test, assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s actions 
under the particular circumstances of the case.4 In his provocative Article 
Taming Self-Defense: Using Deadly Force to Prevent Escapes5, 
Professor Robert Leider argues (1) that the Court has modeled the modern 
 
 * Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. 
 1. “Deadly” force, in this context, means “physical force which, under the circumstances 
in which it is used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury.” Use of Deadly 
Force Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL (last visited Sept. 29, 2019) 
https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/use-of-deadly-force/ [https://perma.cc/TNN4-4UBR]. 
 2. See Robert Leider, Taming Self-Defense: Using Deadly Force to Prevent Escapes, 70 
FLA. L. REV. 971, 972 (2018). 
 3. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229–30 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (naming 
the elements of the self-defense justification).  
 4. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383, 386 (2007) (Applying the Fourth 
Amendment “reasonableness” test to the facts of the case, and holding that “[a] police officer’s 
attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent 
bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at 
risk of serious injury or death”); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“Because ‘[t]he 
test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or 
mechanical application,’ . . . its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the 
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively 
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); 
id. at 397 (“As in other Fourth Amendment contexts . . . the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry . . . is an 
objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of 
the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or 
motivation.”); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (“To determine the constitutionality of 
a seizure, ‘[w]e must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the 
intrusion.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
 5. 70 FLA. L. REV. 971 (2018).  
170 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 70 
 
fleeing felon rule on the law of self-defense;6 (2) that in departing from 
the common-law rule, the Court has introduced a worrisome degree of 
vagueness into the constitutional standard governing police use of force 
against fleeing felons, while also ejecting traditional elements which 
limited the reach of both the common-law fleeing felon rule and the right 
of self-defense;7 and (3) that the self-defense paradigm for fleeing felon 
cases, embraced by the Court in the cases of Tennessee v. Garner8 and 
Scott v. Harris,9 should be replaced with a different justification based on 
the state’s authority to use deadly force in order to ensure compliance 
with the law.10  
First, Professor Leider argues that in assessing an officer’s 
“reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment balancing test, the Court 
has over-relied on the law of self-defense and that “[s]tretching self-
defense doctrine to justify the fleeing felon rule undermines critical 
limitations on private self-defense and has not produced an effective set 
of rules to limit police violence.”11 He sees a broader problem here, not 
only in the Court’s jurisprudence but also in scholarly discussions of 
deadly force—that “the concept of self-defense is swallowing other 
possible justifications for the government’s authority to enforce the rule 
of law.”12 Professor Leider concludes that in order to fix the modern 
fleeing felon rule, courts and scholars must look not to the law of self-
defense but to the state’s authority to compel obedience to law.13 
These are broad claims which might be more easily assessed using the 
Supreme Court’s own framework from Garner. There the Court held 
unconstitutional, under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness rubric, the 
applicable Tennessee statute insofar as it allowed police to use deadly 
force against an unarmed, fleeing suspect even when (as in the case) the 
officer does not believe the suspect to be dangerous.14  
But the Garner Court did not hold that officers may never 
constitutionally use deadly force against suspects who are attempting to 
 
 6. Id. at 971. (“To justify [the modern fleeing felon] rule, the Supreme Court has relied on 
self-defense and defense of others. This Article argues against the self-defense justification.”). 
 7. See id. at 982–85. 
 8. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 9. 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
 10. Leider, supra note 2, at 974 (“[The Article] considers an alternative possible 
justification for the fleeing felon rule grounded in the state’s right to use force to protect its 
political authority.”). 
 11. Id. at 971. 
 12. Id. at 1008. 
 13. Id. at 1011 (“Thus, rather than looking to self-defense, the fleeing felon and prison 
escape rules may have their justification in the idea that legitimate political authority may use 
deadly force to compel obedience to the law and the legal process.”). 
 14. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“A police officer may not seize an 
unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead. The Tennessee statute is unconstitutional 
insofar as it authorizes the use of force against such fleeing suspects.”).  
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escape. Instead, it clarified that: 
Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the 
suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to 
the officer or others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable 
to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the 
suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is 
probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime 
involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious 
physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to 
prevent escape . . . .15 
Parsing the Court’s language helps to tease out a couple of 
complexities in Professor Leider’s argument. The first part of the passage 
undoubtedly invokes self-defense and defense of others, holding that 
officers may use deadly force when they have “probable cause to believe 
that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the 
officer or others,” and then again affirming the right to use deadly force 
“if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon.”16 This language 
envisions cases (unlike Garner) in which police officers chase a fleeing 
suspect, who they believe poses a threat of serious harm to the officers or 
others, or are confronted during the chase by a suspect who threatens 
them with a weapon. Such things do happen, of course—the 2014 
shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri and the 2018 shooting 
of Stephon Clark in Sacramento, California, are two recent cases where 
police officers, while chasing a suspect, came to believe that the suspect 
posed a deadly threat to them, shot the suspect dead, and were later 
determined  to have acted in self-defense.17 As Professor Leider points 
out, the Court in Garner did not explicitly import into its reasonableness 
calculation such elements of the self-defense justification as the 
imminence or necessity elements. Still, self-defense is clearly what the 
Court had in mind here, and in such cases the self-defense model certainly 
offers a natural place from which to assess reasonableness.  
But the latter part of the above excerpt from Garner has quite a 
different valence. It appears to affirm the reasonableness of using deadly 
force when the suspect may not have threatened to do physical harm to 
the officer or unknown others, but when “there is probable cause to 
 
 15. Id. 
 16.  Id.  
 17. See, e.g., Eric Eckholm & Matt Apuzzo, Darren Wilson Is Cleared of Rights Violations 
in Ferguson Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/05/us/darren-wilson-is-cleared-of-rights-violations-in-
ferguson-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/C57F-2PMM]; Chris Hagan et al., No Criminal 
Charges for Sacramento Police Officers Who Fatally Shot Stephon Clark, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(March 2, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/02/699719214/officers-in-stephon-clark-
shooting-wont-be-charged-says-sacramento-d-a [https://perma.cc/2NGG-J3M6].  
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believe that [the suspect] has committed a crime involving the infliction 
or threatened infliction of serious physical harm.”18 This seems to 
reference the paradigmatic “fleeing felon” case, in which a suspect 
commits a violent crime, then flees the scene pursued by a police officer, 
who ultimately shoots him dead solely to prevent the suspect’s escape.19 
May a pursuing police officer use deadly force against a person the officer 
believes has committed a forcible felony, simply to prevent the escape? 
The answer to that question constitutes the “fleeing felon” rule and seems 
to distinguish it from the clear cases of self-defense referenced in the first 
part of the passage. The Court in Garner appears to say that police 
officers may constitutionally use deadly force to prevent escape when 
they reasonably believe the fleeing suspect has committed a forcible 
felony, but has not necessarily threatened them or others with future 
violent harm.  
Is this portion of the Court’s holding grounded in the right of self-
defense? Not so clear.  
It is certainly possible that the Garner Court intended this clause—
allowing police use of deadly force, solely to prevent escape, in cases 
where the officer reasonably believes the suspect has committed a 
forcible felony—as merely an example of the general principle it 
announced just before in Scott, that the use of deadly force is 
constitutionally permissible in cases of self-defense or defense of others. 
In his opinion for the majority in Scott, Justice Scalia suggests as much, 
writing in a footnote that  
 
[t]he necessity described in Garner was, in fact, the need to 
prevent ‘serious physical harm, either to the officer or to 
others.’ By way of example only, Garner hypothesized that 
deadly force may be used ‘if necessary to prevent escape’ 
when the suspect is known to have ‘committed a crime 
involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious 
physical harm,’ so that his mere being at large poses an 
inherent danger to society.20  
If Justice Scalia was correct in characterizing Garner’s holding in that 
way, the Court in Garner may have been using the suspect’s supposed 
 
 18. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11 (1985) (emphasis added). 
 19. In the Stephon Clark case, the officers used deadly force, killing Clark, under the 
mistaken belief that Clark was carrying a gun. See Hagan, supra note 17. Under longstanding self-
defense doctrine, however, a person claiming the defense does not have to prove that their belief 
in the necessity to use deadly force was correct; only that it was reasonable. See, e.g., United 
States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“These beliefs must not only have been 
honestly entertained, but also objectively reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances.”). 
 20. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 n.9 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Professor 
Leider suggests that this footnote supports the idea that the Court in Scott “understood Garner to 
have announced a kind of self-defense rule.” Leider, supra note 2, at 984.  
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commission of a forcible felony as a proxy for his level of dangerousness 
or threat to others, as many modern-day self-defense statutes do.21  
On the other hand, the language in Justice Scalia’s footnote seems at 
least equally compatible with the common-law “community defense” 
rationale as Professor Leider describes it.22 Under that rubric, police use 
of deadly force against an escaping felon was sometimes justified as 
necessary for the protection of society on a “collective defense 
justification,” which “differed from individual self-defense or defense of 
others in that the justification relied on the felon’s intangible threat to the 
community rather than the felon’s threat to particular individuals.”23 I 
was left wondering how, if at all, the Court’s reasoning in Scott supports 
Professor Leider’s claim that the Court has modeled the fleeing felon rule 
specifically—that is, the rule that allows police in some circumstances to 
use deadly force solely to prevent a suspected felon’s escape—on the law 
of self-defense.  
The Article makes a strong case as to Professor Leider’s second 
argument, that the Court’s Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” analysis 
offers scant guidance to legislators, courts, and police departments as they 
assess the limits of the fleeing felon rule. As Professor Leider describes, 
the common-law rule, though quite broad in some ways, also imposed 
clear limits on police use of deadly force to prevent a suspect’s escape.24 
For example, the rule generally did not allow the use of deadly force 
against escaping misdemeanants, and it required that the use of deadly 
force against a fleeing felon be justified by a subsequent affirmative 
finding that the person had indeed committed a “felony in fact.”25 That 
is, a police officer’s reasonable, but mistaken, belief that the fleeing 
 
 21. See, e.g., People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96, 106 (1986) (citing New York state statute 
which allows a person to use “deadly physical force”, inter alia, when the person “reasonably 
believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, 
forcibly sodomy or robbery”).   
 22. Leider, supra note 2, at 978. Professor Leider seems to acknowledge this at one point, 
arguing that Garner is “conflicted between two theories”—that of self-defense and of the 
common-law fleeing felon rule. Id. at 982–83. But Professor Leider then goes on to say that in 
Justice Scalia’s footnote in Scott, referenced above in footnote 19, the Court “clarified Garner’s 
theoretical justification for police use of force against escaping criminals, namely that such force 
is defensive.” Id. at 983. The footnote in question seems a slender reed on which to rest the 
proposition that Garner was premised on self-defense. Note, for example, that Justice Scalia’s 
characterization of Garner, in footnote 9 of Scott, ends by saying that under Garner, deadly force 
could be used to prevent escape when the suspect is believed to have committed a felony and “so 
his mere being at large poses an inherent danger to society.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 382 n.9. (emphasis 
added). Using Professor Leider’s definitions of the relevant terms, that sounds more like the 
common-law “community defense” rationale than the justification of self-defense. Clarification 
would be helpful here. 
 23. Leider, supra note 2, at 978. 
 24.   See id. at 976 
 25. See, e.g., id.  
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suspect had committed a felony had the effect of denying the officer a 
“fleeing felon” defense to a criminal charge arising from the officer’s use 
of deadly force.26 As Professor Leider notes, the “felony in fact” doctrine 
thus had protective effects from the viewpoint of criminal suspects: “By 
requiring a felony in fact, courts made reliance on the justification 
precarious for those who were uncertain whether the suspect actually 
committed a crime and, if he did commit a crime, whether the crime 
constituted a felony.”27  
The Supreme Court did not import the felony in fact doctrine into its 
analysis of the modern cases. In addition, the Court’s modern take on the 
fleeing felon rule, as represented in Garner and Scott, has not embraced 
key elements which limit the reach of self-defense, such as the rule that 
use of deadly force is justified only when the party claiming the defense 
was faced with an “imminent threat” and when the claimant reasonably 
believed that deadly force was necessary to prevent death or serious 
bodily injury.28 Finally, as to vagueness, Professor Leider argues that the 
Court’s holding in Scott, and to a lesser extent its holding in Garner, 
replaced the clear lines drawn by the common law rule with a fact-
specific reasonableness standard under which “[p]olice lack any way to 
know ex ante whether their use of force is lawful, unless courts happen 
to have adjudicated a case involving a similar fact pattern.”29 In an era of 
heightened attention to excessive use of force by police, these issues of 
vagueness and lack of boundaries are, and should be, important concerns.  
Where does this leave us? How, in the absence of more specific 
constitutional guidance, should we think about reforming the modern 
fleeing felon rule? For those who believe that police use of deadly force 
against escaping suspects should be more restricted than it has been in the 
past, one emerging solution embraces the self-defense model by adopting 
its limits as well as its permissions.  
For example, in California (where Stephon Clark was killed)30, state 
legislators recently proposed a police use-of-force bill that closely 
parallels the fleeing felon provision in Garner but adds limits familiar to 
the law of self-defense.31 In relevant part, AB 392 provides that the killing 
of a suspect by police is justifiable “when the officer reasonably believes, 
 
 26. Id. at 976–77 (Professor Leider notes that “[t]his [felony in fact] requirement differs 
from ordinary self-defense rules, which permit a person to act on reasonable belief even if that 
belief is mistaken.”) t 
 27. Id. at 976–77. 
 28. See id. at 982.  
 29. Id. at 985.  
 30.  See Christine Hauser, Sacramento Man Fatally Shot by the Police in His Backyard, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/us/stephon-clark-police-
shooting.html [https://perma.cc/NP6N-PYX8]. 
 31.  See, e.g., 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 170 (AB 392) (West) (amending Cal. Penal Code 
§§ 196, 835a).  
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based on the totality of the circumstances, that such force is necessary for 
either of the following reasons:”32 First, “[t]o defend against an imminent 
threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to another 
person.”33 Or second, “[t]o apprehend a fleeing person for any felony that 
threatened or resulted in death or serious bodily injury, if the officer 
reasonably believes that the person will cause death or serious bodily 
injury to another unless immediately apprehended.”34 Additionally, the 
second scenario also requires that “[w]here feasible, a peace officer shall 
. . . make reasonable efforts to identify themselves . . . [and] warn that 
deadly force may be used” unless the suspect unless stops trying to 
escape.35 The bill further guides the determination of whether deadly 
force is necessary by stating that “officers shall evaluate each situation in 
light of the particular circumstances of each case, and shall use other 
available resources and techniques if reasonably safe and feasible to an 
objectively reasonable officer.”36  
Within a framework which generally mirrors the language and the 
Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” approach of Garner, AB-392 adds 
restrictions which invoke the “imminence” and “necessity” elements of 
self-defense.37 Other states and some individual police departments have 
moved in the same direction, importing restrictions which make clear that 
police use of deadly force against fleeing suspects can be justified only 
when necessary—for example, when the police have first attempted to 
de-escalate the confrontation and, if feasible, have first tried non-lethal 
methods of apprehending the suspect.38 This type of solution could 
 
 32.  Id.   
 33.  Id.    
 34.  Id.    
 35. Id. (emphasis added). See also Anita Chabria, Why California’s proposed law on 
deadly police force isn’t as tough as it seems, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2019), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-me-california-use-of-force-police-shootings-stephon-clark-
20190404-story.html [https://perma.cc/P4WP-D6RU] (discussing the implications of the new 
bill). 
 36. 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 170 (AB 392) (West) (emphasis added).  
 37. See id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229–30 (1986) (“There 
must have been a threat, actual or apparent, of the use of deadly force against the defender. The 
threat must have been unlawful and immediate. The defender must have believed that he was in 
imminent peril of death or serious bodily harm, and that his response was necessary to save 
himself therefrom.”).  
 38. See, e.g., James Drew, Deal Reached on Police Deadly Force Law After Sides Iron Out 
‘Good Faith” Standard, TACOMA NEWS TRIB. (Jan. 14, 2019), 
https://www.thenewstribune.com/news/politics-government/article224537100.html 
[https://perma.cc/G9KK-VGJT] (discussing deadly force legislation in Washington state); 
Tatyana Hopkins, GW Law Professor Crafts Police Use of Force Legislation, GW TODAY (Mar. 
20, 2019), https://gwtoday.gwu.edu/gw-law-professor-crafts-police-use-force-legislation 
[https://perma.cc/J3EA-6SVE] (discussing police use of force legislation in Maryland); Hannah 
Wiley, Time, Money, and a ‘Culture Shift:’ How Three California Police Departments 
Overhauled Their Policies, SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 25, 2019) 
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strengthen the analogy of the fleeing felon rule to the law of self-defense. 
Professor Leider recommends a very different approach. Rather than 
looking to self-defense law to justify the fleeing felon rule, he suggests 
justifying the rule under the state’s general authority to compel 
compliance with the law.39 Critiquing the lack of modern scholarship 
examining the question of “when governments may permissibly 
authorize deadly force apart from self-defense,”40 he argues: 
Fleeing felons and escaped convicts have committed a 
double breach of the community’s laws. They have 
committed the underlying crime, and then renounced their 
obligation to submit to the legal system. The community, in 
turn, authorizes deadly force to protect the community’s way 
of life by enforcing minimal obligations to submit to the rule 
of law. Thus, rather than looking to self-defense, the fleeing 
felon and prison escape rules may have their justification in 
the idea that legitimate political authority may use deadly 
force to compel obedience to the law and the legal process.41 
Professor Leider further suggests that the Scott court, in the above-
referenced footnote,42 may have been wrong to define the relevant 
meaning of “necessity” as “the need to protect human life against the 
threat posed by the felon,”43 a definition which (he argues) evokes the 
right of self-defense. Instead, Professor Leider writes, “the relevant 
metric of necessity . . . [should have been] the need to protect the legal 
system against those trying to escape [it].”44  
It is difficult to know what to make of this proposal. The notion that 
the legal system has some sort of right to protect itself by using deadly 
force against its citizens is simultaneously mundane and terrifying. If “the 
need to protect the legal system against those trying to escape it” simply 
restates the law’s authority to punish defiance of its prohibitions, this is 
(to put it mildly) nothing new—and indeed raises the question of how, 
exactly, Professor Leider’s proposed focus on such protections would 
move us forward from the status quo. On this interpretation, Professor 
Leider’s suggested approach does not seem to advance the central 
argument of the article—that “government has the normative authority to 
permit deadly force for reasons beyond self-defense and defense of 
 
https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article227278314.html 
[https://perma.cc/F3CG-8XG2] (discussing police departments in Los Angeles, San Francisco, 
and Stockton making changes to their deadly force policies).  
 39.  See Leider, supra note 2, at 974. 
 40. Id. at 1008. 
 41. Id. at 1010–11. 
 42. See supra, note 20 and accompanying text.  
 43. Leider, supra note 2, at 1011. 
 44. Id. at 1003.  
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others,”45 and that such authority has been under-theorized and under-
discussed in the relevant scholarly literatures.46 
But Professor Leider suggests a different meaning, one that relates 
more closely to longstanding political-theory debates over the nature and 
legitimacy of “just war” and related issues which explore the state’s 
authority to “defend a common way of life.”47 He writes: 
[D]efending the common way of life may also justify state 
coercion within civil society. Having and maintaining legal 
institutions are integral components of our ability to exercise 
our rights free from the interference of others. The 
maintenance of legal institutions requires that the state have 
power to overcome resistance to the laws.48 
Professor Leider draws the inference that the state may have a 
previously unacknowledged right, in domestic cases involving citizens, 
to use “deadly force against fleeing criminals . . . to force them” into 
compliance with the law.49 To the extent that such a rule envisions the 
state as an entity with the right to kill citizens before they have been 
afforded the legal guarantees which authorize just punishment—arrest, 
indictment, conviction, sentencing—it is hard to see what the beneficial 
result of such a rule would be. Although it is certainly true that a fleeing 
suspect who is suspected of committing a forcible felony violates the law 
simply by escaping, the idea that the escape alone gives law enforcement 
the right—in service of defending the law and the community’s way of 
life—to kill the person, seems vulnerable to one of the same flaws that 
Professor Leider identified in analyzing the faults of the modern fleeing 
felon rule: A lack of proportionality between the offense and the 
sanction.50 
Indeed, perhaps in recognition of the breadth, and potential for abuse, 
of such state authority, Professor Leider ultimately suggests that the same 
limitations—necessity, imminence, and proportionality—which confine 
the right of self-defense, could be useful in cabining the state’s authority 
to compel compliance with law by using deadly force against fleeing 
felons.51 What he does not do, at least in this Article, is conduct a detailed 
comparison of his proposal with proposals such as AB-392, which appear 
to seek reform of the fleeing felon rule by embracing, rather than 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. at 1007–09. 
 47. Id. at 1009. 
 48. Id. at 1010. 
 49. Id.  
 50. See id. at 993 (“Examining the legitimacy of the use of force to prevent [prison] escapes 
from prisons presents similar questions as the fleeing felon rule. Although nearly all convicted 
inmates are sentenced to lose their liberty, they have not been sentenced to lose their lives.”). 
 51. See id. at 1011–12. 
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rejecting, the model of self-defense. Such a comparison would be 
enormously helpful, both to a clearer understanding of the implications 
of Professor Leider’s proposal and to a rational calculation of its relative 
costs and benefits. Perhaps Professor Leider plans to do such a 
comparison in future work. In its absence, the self-defense model for 
amending the fleeing felon rule—perhaps by importing traditional 
restraints such as imminence and necessity—seems to offer the historical 
context, intuitive boundaries, and practical accessibility that can usefully 
guide reform-minded courts, legislatures, and law enforcement. 
